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 Das first proposed two-factor authentication combining the smart card and 
password to resolve the security problems of wireless sensor networks 
(WSNs). After that, various researchers studied two-factor authentication 
suitable for WSNs. In user authentication protocols based on the symmetric 
key approach, a number of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)-based 
authentication protocols have been proposed. To resolve the security and 
efficiency problems of ECC-based two-factor authentication protocols, Jiang 
et al. proposed a privacy-aware two-factor authentication protocol based on 
ECC for WSNs. However, this paper performs a vulnerability analysis on 
Jiang et al.’s authentication protocol and shows that it has security problems, 
such as a lack of mutual authentication, a risk of SID modification and DoS 
attacks, a lack of sensor anonymity, and weak ID anonymity. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) can be used to perform real-time monitoring in various 
environments. Networked sensors can easily be stationed in various environments (e.g., for forest detection 
and harmful gas monitoring) [1]. Generally, the gateway node has sufficient power and capacity, while the 
wireless sensors lack sufficient CPU power, memory, computational capability, and storage capacity. 
Therefore, generally, a user needs to connect with sensors directly to acquire the sensed data [2]. Considering 
the resources of sensors, the user authentication protocol for WSNs should be efficient in terms of 
computation cost. Therefore, the power consumption of the cryptographic algorithms used should be reduced 
while addressing the security requirements. To resolve the difficulty of designing a secure two-factor 
authentication protocol, a privacy-aware two-factor protocol that addressed various security problems with 
the resource sensors and sensed data was designed in [3].  
In 2009, Das first applied two-factor authentication combining the password and smart card to solve 
the security problems of WSNs. It presented a new direction for user authentication for WSNs [4]. However, 
the authentication protocol Das proposed does not provide user anonymity, session key negotiation, or 
mutual authentication. In addition, it is vulnerable to several attacks, such as gateway node bypassing, offline 
password guessing, sensor node capture, and denial-of-service attacks. Thus, various improved authentication 
protocols for WSNs were proposed to resolve the various security problems [5-7]. In addition, in user 
authentication protocols based on the symmetric key approach, a number of elliptic curve cryptography 
(ECC)-based authentication protocols have been proposed. Yeh et al. found that the protocol of Chen et al. 
does not provide a user password updating mechanism and is vulnerable to insider attacks. Thus, Yeh et al. 
proposed an ECC-based two-factor authentication protocol. However, in Yeh et al.’s scheme, the user and 
sensor cannot mutually authenticate each other [8]. To solve the problems of Yeh et al.’s scheme, Shi et al. 
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proposed an improved ECC-based authentication protocol. Compared with the protocol of Yeh et al., the 
protocol of Shi et al. provides more diverse security features and performs better in terms of computation and 
communication [9]. However, in 2014, Choi et al. revealed that the authentication protocol of Shi et al. is 
vulnerable to unknown key share, stolen smart card, and sensor energy exhausting attacks. To eliminate these 
security weaknesses, they also proposed an enhanced authentication protocol [1]. Unfortunately, the protocol 
of Choi et al. still cannot achieve anonymity and untraceability. To solve the various security weaknesses of 
ECC-based two-factor authentication protocols, Jiang et al. proposed a privacy-aware two-factor 
authentication protocol based on ECC for WSNs. Jiang et al. claim their protocol achieves various security 
and usability features necessary for real-life application environments [2]. However, this paper analyzes 
Jiang et al.’s protocol and shows that it has security vulnerabilities, such as a lack of mutual authentication, a 
risk of SID modification and DoS attacks, a lack of sensor anonymity, and weak ID anonymity. The 
remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains Jiang et al.’s privacy-aware two-factor 
authentication protocol based on ECC for WSNs. Section 3 shows that Jiang et al.’s authentication protocol 
has the security vulnerabilities noted above. Section 4 concludes this paper. 
 
 
2. REVIEW OF JIANG ET AL.’ TWO-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL 
Jiang et al.’s protocol is based on ECC for WSNs. It consists of four phases: registration, login, 
authentication, and password change. Table 1 shows the notations used in this paper [2]. The ECC provides 
better efficiency than Rivest Shamir and Adleman (RSA), because it can achieve the same security strength 
with a smaller key size. Specifically, the 160-bit ECC and the 1024-bit RSA have the same security strength 
[10], [11]. The elliptic curve equation is defined in the form: Ep (a,b) :y
2
 = x
3
 + ax + b ( mod p ) over a prime 
finite field Fp , where , b ∈ Fp , and  4a
3
 +27b
2
 ≠ 0 ( mod p ). 
 
 
Table 1. Notations 
Notation Description Notation Description 
Ui A user GWN A gateway node 
Sj Sensor node SIDj Sensor node identity 
H(∙) Hash function IDi The identity of Ui 
PWi The password of Ui TS The current timestamp 
SKij Shared session key PTCi Protected temporal credential of Ui 
DIDi, DIDGWN A dynamic identity of Ui and S TCi , TCj Temporal credential of Ui and S 
TEi The expiration time of a user’s temporal 
credential 
KGWN-U , 
KGWN -S 
Master keys only known to GWN 
|| The bitwise concatenation ⊕ The bitwise exclusive OR 
 
 
2.1. Registration Phase 
Prior to starting Jiang et al.’s authentication protocol, GWN selects the finite cyclic additional group 
G generated by a point P with a large prime order n over a finite field Fp on an elliptic curve. Then, GWN 
randomly chooses a number x as its private key, computes the corresponding public key y = xP, and 
generates two master secret keys KGWN-U and KGWN -S. Then, GWN stores x and produces the system 
parameters {E(Fp ), G, P, y}. Figure 1 shows the user registration process. It is assumed that the 
communication channel between the participants is secure.  
(R1-U) When a user Ui registers to GWN, Ui selects his/her own identity IDi and password PWi and randomly 
chooses a number ri. Then, Ui calculates HPWi = H(PWi  || IDi || ri ) and sends { IDi , HPWi } to GWN. 
(R2-U) After receiving the request, GWN checks the legitimacy of IDi and refuses the request if IDi does not 
adapt to the requirement of user identity or is the same as an already registered identity in the 
verification table. Then, GWN computes TCi = H(KGWN-U  || IDi || TEi ) and PTCi = TCi ⊕ HPWi . 
GWN stores ( IDi , TEi ) in the verification table. Finally, GWN publishes the card, which embraces 
{ H (∙), y , TEi , PTCi } to Ui. 
(R3-U) Ui computes HPW’i =  H(h(IDi || PWi || ri ) mod m ), where m is  2
8
 ≤ m ≤ 216 integer, which 
determines the capacity of the pool of < IDi , PWi > pairs against offline password guessing attacks 
[12]. Then, Ui hoards ri and HPW ′i into the card. 
 
The sensor registration process is described as follows: 
(R1-S) Sj presents its identity SIDj to GWN using a secure channel. 
(R2-S) GWN computes TCj = H( KGWN-S || SIDj ) as the credential for Sj. Then, GWN replies to Sj with { TCj }. 
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(R3-S) After receiving the response, Sj keeps TC. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Registration phase of Jiang et al.’s protocol 
 
 
 
2.2. Login Phase 
The following steps are performed in the system login phase. 
(L1) When Ui wants to access Sj , Ui slots the smart card into a terminal and inputs IDi  , PWi .  
(L2) The smart card calculates HPW’i =  H( h(IDi || PWi || ri ) mod m ). If the comparison HPW
*
i ? = HPW
’
i is 
not the same, the card rejects the request. Otherwise, it continues to compute TCi = PTCi ⊕ H(PWi ||IDi 
|| ri ). 
 
2.3. Authentication Phase 
Subsequent to the login phase, the communicating agents ( Ui , Sj , and GWN ) mutually authenticate 
each other and establish a session key as follows. Figure 2 depicts these phases.  
(A1) Ui selects a random number a ∈ Z
*
p-1 and calculates Ai = aP, Di = ay = axP, DIDi = IDi ⊕ H( Ai || Di ), 
and Ci = H( IDi || TS1 || Di || Ai || TCi ), where TS1 is the timestamp of the current computing platform. 
Finally, Ui forwards { DIDi , Ai , TS1 , Ci } to GWN.  
(A2) On receiving { DIDi , Ai , TS1 , Ci }, GWN verifies the freshness of TS1. If TS1 is not fresh, GWN refuses 
the request; otherwise, GWN calculates Di = xA = xaP, IDi = DIDi ⊕ H(Ai || Di ), and TCi = H ( KGWN-U 
|| IDi || TEi ) and checks whether H( IDi || TS1 || Di || Ai || TCi ) is the same as Ci. If these two values are 
not the same, GWN refuses the request; otherwise, GWN chooses a sensor Sj and calculates TCj = 
H(KGWN-S || SIDj ), DIDGWN =IDi ⊕ H(DIDi || TCj || TS5 ), and CGWN =H( IDi || TCj || Ai || TS2 ), where 
TS2  is the timestamp of the current computing platform. Finally, GWN sends { TS2 , DIDi , DIDGWN , 
CGWN , Ai } to the Sj .  
(A3) On receiving { TS2 , DIDi , DIDGWN , CGWN , Ai }, Sj checks the freshness of TS2 . If TS2 is invalid, Sj 
rejects the request; otherwise, Sj computes IDi = DIDGWN ⊕ H( DIDi || TCj || TS2 ) and checks whether 
H( IDi || TCj ||Ai || TS2 ) and CGWN are equal. If these two values are unequal, Sj terminates the current 
session; otherwise, Sj generates a random key b∈Z
*
P-1 and computes Bj = bP, SKij = H( bAi ) = H(abP) , 
and Cj = H(TCj || IDi || SIDj || Bj || TS3 ), where TS3 is the current timestamp. Sj then sends { SIDj , TS3 , 
Cj , Bj } to GWN. 
(A4) After checking the legitimacy of TS3, GWN checks whether H( TCj ||IDi || SIDj || Bj ||TS3 ) and Cj are 
the same. If these two values are not equal, GWN stops the current session; otherwise, GWN confirms 
that Sj is authenticated. Finally, GWN calculates EGWN  = H(IDi ||TCi || Di || Bj || TS4 ), where TS4 is the 
timestamp of the current computing platform, and sends { SIDj ,TS4 , Bj , EGWN } to Ui . 
(A5) After checking the freshness of TS4, Ui computes and checks whether H( IDi || TCi || Di || Bj || TS4 ) and 
EGWN are equal. If these two values are not the same, Ui stops the current session; otherwise, Ui  confirms 
that Sj and GWN are authenticated. Finally, Ui computes the shared session key SKij = H( aBj ) = 
H( abP ). 
 
                ISSN: 2088-8708 
Int J Elec & Comp Eng, Vol. 8, No. 1, February 2018 :  605 – 610 
608 
 
 
Figure 2. Login and authentication phase of Jiang et al.’s protocol 
 
 
2.4. Password Change Phase 
(PC1) 1 If Ui wants to update his/her own password, he or she inputs his/her own card into a terminal and 
enters IDi and PWi . Figure 3 shows the password change phase of Jiang et al.’s protocol 
(PC2) The smart card calculates H(h(IDi || PWi || ri ) mod m ). If the equations HPW
*
i ? = HPW
’
i are not the 
same, the card refuses the request. Otherwise, Ui inputs the old PWi , selects a new PW′i , calculates 
PTC′i = TCi ⊕ RPWi ⊕ H( r || PW’i ), and replaces PTCi with PTC′i .  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Password change phase of Jiang et al.’s protocol 
 
 
3. CRYPTANALYSIS ON JIANG ET AL.’S  TWO-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL 
This paper analyzes Jiang et al.’s authentication protocol and determines various security 
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vulnerabilities, including a lack of mutual authentication, a risk of SID modulation and DoS attacks, a lack of 
sensor anonymity, and weak ID anonymity. 
 
3.1. Lack of Mutual Authentication 
Mutual authentication means that two or three parties authenticate each other. All of the parties 
(e.g., client/user, gateway, and sensors) are assured of the others’ identity. The user and gateway authenticate 
each other using IDi and TCi, while the gateway and sensors authenticate each other using TCj and CGWN. 
However, mutual authentication between the user and sensors is not provided. The sensors can authenticate 
the user with the gateway’s help. However, the user cannot authenticate the sensors. Thus, the user cannot 
verify whether the sensor SIDj is normal.   
 
3.2. Risk of SID Modification Attacks 
The user receives { SIDj, TS2, Bj, EGWN  } from GWN and checks the message’s accuracy and 
freshness. However, there is no information indicating that SIDj in { SIDj, TS2, Bj, EGWN } is now 
authenticated by GWN, so an attacker can perform a SID modification attack. When the attacker modifies the 
SIDj in { SIDj, TS2, Bj, EGWN } to SIDattacker, the user is unaware of the change. Therefore, the user mistakenly 
believes that SIDattacker is a normal sensor node and thus computes the session key SKij for secure 
communication with SIDattacker even though the attacker cannot know the SKij. Moreover, when SIDj requests 
communication, the user cannot know whether SIDj is an authenticated sensor node, so they cannot 
communicate with each other.  
 
3.3. Lack of Sensor Anonymity 
Anonymity is a desirable security feature, and it provides identification and key agreement of the 
user and sensors during the login and authentication phases. Thus, Jiang et al.’s authentication protocol 
provides the user’s dynamic identification DIDi to protect the user’s anonymity. Moreover, this protocol uses 
DIDGWN to protect the gateway node’s identification. However, Jiang et al.’s authentication protocol does not 
provide anonymity of the sensor node. Therefore, an attacker can know which sensor node is communicating 
with users. In addition, the attacker can abuse the sensor node’s identification, because SIDj can be easily 
known by the attacker. Therefore, the anonymity of sensor nodes needs to be provided. First, Sj checks the 
freshness of TS2. Then, if TS2 is valid, Sj computes IDi = DIDGWN ⊕ H( DIDi || TCj || TS2 ) and checks 
whether  H( IDi || TCj ||Ai || TS2 ) and the received CGWN are equal.  
 
3.4. DoS Attack 
A DoS attack is an attempt to make a machine or network resource unavailable so regular users 
cannot use the system’s resources. Although the methods, motives, and targets of DoS attacks may vary, they 
generally involve efforts to temporarily or indefinitely interrupt or suspend the services of a host connected to 
the Internet. In Jiang et al.’s authentication protocol, sensor nodes can verify the freshness of a message using 
TS2. Therefore, when an attacker sends a previous message to the sensor node, the sensor node knows 
whether this message is a current message or a previous message. However, after an attacker gets the 
previous message { TS2 , DIDi , DIDGWN , CGWN , Ai }, the attacker sends the message  changing only TS2 to 
the current timestamp. To check the legitimacy of the message, the sensor node needs to execute various 
computations, such as hash function (twice), verification function (twice), and timestamp checking (once). 
The sensor node has limited battery power and computational ability, so it is possible that a sensor node 
cannot perform its normal functions when an attacker executes a DoS attack on the sensor node. 
 
3.5. Weak ID Anonymity 
In Jiang et al.’s authentication protocol, the user can maintain the ID anonymity using DIDi. An 
attacker cannot compute IDi from DIDi, because the attacker does not know H( Ai || Di ) in DIDi = IDi ⊕ 
H( Ai || Di ). However, IDi can be exposed in the sensor nodes gained by the attacker. The sensor nodes are 
scattered in various places, so the attacker can find the sensor nodes and obtain their authority. Therefore, the 
attacker can compute the user’s identity using IDi = DIDGWN ⊕ H( DIDi || TCj || TS2 ), because the sensor 
nodes know TCj , which is shared in the sensor registration phase. Hence, the attacker can get IDi after gaining 
the sensor nodes, and the anonymity of this protocol is not strong.  
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Jiang et al. proposed a privacy-aware two-factor authentication protocol using ECC for WSNs. They 
insist that their protocol achieves various security and usability features necessary for real-life application 
environments while maintaining acceptable efficiency. However, this paper analyzed Jiang et al.’s protocol 
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and showed that this protocol has security vulnerabilities, such as a lack of mutual authentication, a risk of 
SID modification and DoS attacks, a lack of sensor anonymity, and weak ID anonymity. To solve these 
vulnerabilities, a security-enhanced privacy-aware two-factor authentication protocol using ECC for WSNs 
needs to be proposed. 
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